Abstract: This paper analyzes to what extent East Asia's integration into global value chains (GVCs) has made the region more vulnerable to business cycle shocks in the West. We identify different channels through which business cycle shocks in the West can propagate to East Asian countries via global value chains. We next demonstrate that standard measures of external dependence are biased since they do not adequately capture the effects of these various GVC channels. Finally, we apply our framework to gain new insights into the role of GVCs in triggering East Asia's trade collapse during the Global Recession of 2008-2009. 
Introduction
In the past few decades, East Asia has become a key player in the global value chains (GVCs) of products that are consumed in Western markets. Many income-sensitive, high-technology products that can be found on the shelves of Best Buy in the United States or FNAC in France incorporate components produced in Japan, the Asian Dragons (Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), in the five largest ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and in China.
Among many academics and policymakers in East Asia, this trend has led to growing concern that the region is becoming more vulnerable or "coupled" to business cycle movements in the West. Economic downturns in the West, so they argue, can reverberate globally through supply chains, leading to significant export reductions and economic contractions in East Asia. This concern has been fueled further by the results of a number of recent empirical studies. Using the Asian International Input-Output table, Pula and Peltonen (2011a) estimate that East Asia's dependence on export markets has steadily risen since 1995. Similarly, Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2010) analyze East Asia's changing trade patterns and conclude that the region's trade dependence of the rest of the world has increased in the past few decades. This rising trade dependence is found to have increased the region's macroeconomic dependence on the West. Park et al. (2011) estimates that, since the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis, the real economic interdependence between East Asia and the West has significantly increased. Dees and Vansteenkiste (2007) , in contrast, argue that the East Asian economic region remains largely decoupled from the West.
In this paper, we investigate to what extent and through which channels East Asia's integration into GVCs has affected its economic dependence on Western markets. We conduct our analysis in four steps. First, we use international trade data to document East Asia's growing role and changing position in GVCs (section 2). Second, we discuss the various types of channels through which idiosyncratic shocks can internationally propagate and even magnify through GVCs (section 3). Third, we analyze how traditional measures of a country's exposure to external demand shocks are biased since they inadequately capture the transmission channels of these idiosyncratic shocks (section 4). Finally, we apply our framework to analyze the role of GVCs in East Asia's trade collapse during the Global Recession of 2008-2009 (section 5) .
East Asia's role in GVCs 2
The organization of international production has fundamentally changed in the past few decades. Thanks to reductions in communication costs, transportation costs and other trade barriers, many firms have sliced up their supply chains, and have dispersed their production activities across multiple countries. At the same time, they have outsourced large portions of their supply chain activities to external firms. As a result, the production process of consumer goods now involves many firms that are located in various countries across the globe, giving rise to GVCs.
An implication of the rise of GVCs is that international trade is increasingly dominated by trade in tasks (within GVCs) instead of trade in goods (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008) . Currently, trade in intermediate inputs accounts for roughly two-thirds of international trade (Johnson and Noguera 2012) . In addition, countries rely more and more on imported inputs to produce their exports. For instance, Hummels et al. (2001) use input-output tables for 14 countries and estimate that the import content on average accounted for nearly 21% of the exports value in 1990. Using more recent data, Miroudot and Ragoussis (2009) estimate that the average import content of exports has risen from 26% in 1995 to 31% in 2005.
GVCs have expanded asymmetrically across industries, predominantly emerging in durable goods sectors and less in nond-durable goods and services. Miroudot and Rigoussis (2009) estimate that the import content embodied in key durable goods exports such as electronics and automobiles represented more than 40% of exports value in 2005. For services, they estimated import content to amount to less than 15%.
Within durable goods sectors, East Asian economies have taken on a key role in the GVCs, effectively turning the region into the "factory of the world". Trade patterns reflect East Asia's growing dominance in durable goods sectors. From 2000 to 2007, East Asia's share in world durable goods exports has grown from 35% to 42%. The growth in the share of the world's durable goods exports is not only due to its overall trade expansion, but also due to its specialization in durable goods trade. As shown in figure 1, the exports of East Asian economies are more heavily concentrated in durable goods than the rest of the world. With the exception of Indonesia and Vietnam, the share of durable goods exports in total exports exceeded 45% for all East Asian countries in 2007. This is largely due to East Asia's key role in the GVCs of electronics. Electronics constituted more than half of durable goods exports in 2007 for the region, except for Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan. Plotting the countries according to their position in GVCs (x-axis) and their level of development (y-axis) gives rise to the well-known smiley shape that has been identified for the value chains of electronics products (Mudambi 2008) . Upstream stages such as design, R&D and production of sophisticated components are generally located in developed countries, while manufacturing and especially final assembly activities are relocated to developing countries. Finally, the downstream activities marketing and consumption once again take place in developed countries. 
GVCs and the international propagation of shocks
East Asia's growing integration into GVCs has increased the region's exposure to idiosyncratic supply chain shocks. A well-known empirical regularity in macroeconomics is the "trade-comovement puzzle." This states that country pairs that trade more with each other experience higher business cycle correlation (Frankel and Rose 1998) . Recent empirical studies find that GVC linkages are a key driver of the tradecomovement puzzle (Burstein et al. 2005 , Ng 2010 , and especially in North-South trade (di Giovanni and Levchenko 2010). Four types of idiosyncratic supply chain shocks can be transmitted through GVC linkages: supply shocks, demand shocks, credit shocks and trade friction shocks. We consider them in turn.
Supply shocks. Consider the following example to explain the propagation of supply shocks along GVCs. Suppose that in figure 3 there is a sudden negative shock in the supply of Japanese components that reduces Japan's exports to the Asian dragons. If these components are not highly substitutable, the Asian dragons will not be able to process their components, therefore requiring them to reduce their exports to the final assembly platforms China and Thailand. The final assembly platforms, on their turn, will not be able to assemble as many final goods, thereby reducing their final goods exports to the consumer markets in the U.S. and E.U. The just-in-time nature of many GVCs implies that the speed of transmission across the chain can be almost instantaneous (de Backer 2011). As a result, the negative supply shock can lead to a synchronized trade decline for all GVC participants. This is precisely what happened in the aftermath of the 2011 Tohohoku earthquake and tsunami (Escaith et al. 2011) . As soon as the disaster hit, the production of Japanese intermediate components dried up, creating a disruption of international supply chains in the automotive and electronics industry, and affecting the price and availability of these goods around the world.
Demand shocks. GVCs can also transmit demand shocks across value chain participants. To see this, consider once again figure 3. Suppose there is a sudden decline in U.S. or E.U. demand for final durable goods. This would decrease the demand for imports from the final assembly platforms China and Thailand. In turn, since these final assembly platforms heavily rely on imported components, they would react to the negative demand shock by importing fewer components from the Asian dragons. Moreover, the Asian dragons would react to the shock by importing fewer inputs from the next upstream stage, Japan. As a result, the negative demand shock can lead to a sudden, synchronized trade decline throughout the East Asian region. A demand shock may even amplify as it moves up the GVC due to inventory adjustments (Alessandria et al. 2010 , 2011 , Altomonte et al. 2012 . The logic for such a bullwhip effect is the following. Businesses typically face forecast errors in their sales against which they try to shelter by building safety stocks of inventories. When a downstream firm is confronted with a drop in demand for its final products, its first reaction is then to run down its inventories, therefore more than proportionally reducing its orders of upstream components. The upstream component processor, on its turn, reacts to the amplified drop in demand by also running down its inventories, leading to an even larger drop in the demand for imported components. As this inventory adjustment process propagates upstream, the demand shock continues to amplify.
Credit shocks. GVC linkages can additionally transmit credit shocks along the chain. In international business, exporters routinely rely on external capital to cover substantial upfront costs that cannot be financed out of retained earnings or internal cash flows from operations. Indeed, a survey conducted by the World Bank finds that firms typically finance about 20% of their working capital with trade credit from banks or from their suppliers (Raddatz 2010) . In addition to extensively using trade credit as a source of funds, most firms simultaneously grant credit to their customers (Fabbri and Klapper 2008) . In GVCs where firms rely on each other for credit, a shock to the liquidity of one firm may cause a chain reaction in which other firms also get in financial difficulty (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997) . Raddatz (2010) finds empirical support for the presence and relevance of credit shocks. Using data for 43 countries and 378 manufacturing industries pairs from 1980-2000, he estimates that an increase in the use of trade credit along the input-output chain linking two industries results in an increase in their output correlation.
Trade friction shocks. Besides acting as a vehicle for transmitting idiosyncratic shocks internationally, trade within GVCs is also more sensitive to system-wide trade friction shocks than regular trade. To illustrate this, consider figure 4. The left panel shows a traditional trade pattern where a product is entirely produced in country 2 and then exported to country 3 for consumption. The right panel shows a vertically specialized trade pattern within a GVC. Country 1 produces inputs and exports them to country 2. Country 2 uses the imported inputs to produce a final good. Finally, country 2 exports its output to country 3 for consumption. In the GVC, the input produced in country 1 ends up crossing borders two times, leading to a multiplication of trade frictions. Hummels et al. (2001) and Yi (2003) use this argument to explain how global tariff reductions can lead to a disproportionate growth in vertically specialized trade. But the converse is also true: a world-wide increase in trade frictions could lead to a magnified decrease in trade within GVCs. Using Chinese data, Gangnes et al. (2011) provide evidence that trade within GVCs is indeed more sensitive to global oil price shocks than regular trade. 
GVCs and East Asia's exposure to external demand shocks
The rise of GVCs and their role in transmitting idiosyncratic supply chain shocks imply that traditional measures of a country's economic exposure to external demand shocks are biased. The standard way to measure a country's economic exposure through trade to an external demand shock is the amount of bilateral exports normalized by GDP. According to this measure, a country such as Malaysia whose exports of goods to the U.S. amounts to 19% of its GDP is considered more vulnerable to a U.S. recession than Taiwan for which exports to the U.S. are only 10% of its GDP.
The export-to-GDP ratio inaccurately measures a country's exposure to external demand shocks for two reasons. On the one hand, there is a downward bias (indirect exports bias) since the measure only considers a country's direct bilateral exports, while ignoring indirect exports through third countries. On the other hand, there is an upward bias (import content bias) since the measure ignores countries' reliance on imported inputs to produce its exports. In this section, we provide empirical evidence of these two biases and investigate the true trade exposure of East Asian countries to U.S. and E.U. demand shocks.
Indirect export bias. The export-to-GDP ratio may underestimate a country's exposure to external demand shocks since it only considers a country's direct bilateral exports, while ignoring indirect exports through third countries. This leads to an indirect exports bias. As we have seen above, a significant portion of East Asian countries' exports are first sent to other East Asian countries before being ultimately exported to the West for final consumption. These indirect exports are also vulnerable to demand shocks in the West, and may even become amplified upstream due to the bullwhip effect. We can illustrate the importance of the indirect exports bias with data from China's processing trade regime.
6 Under this customs regime, firms located in China receive duty exemptions on imported inputs, but only if the processed goods are subsequently exported. As a result, all processing imports from East Asia by definition are indirectly exported to other countries. Figure 5 shows East Asia's importance as a supplier of inputs to China's processing trade regime. For all East Asian economies except Indonesia and Vietnam, more than 40% of their exports to China in 2007 were processing inputs. For Taiwan it amounted to almost 70% of their exports to China.
Figure 5. Percent of exports to China that are processing inputs, 2007
Source: Authors' calculation using China Customs Statistics. The data are adjusted to correct for Hong Kong reexports. See Ma et al. (2009) for the correction procedure. 6 We only gauge the size of indirect exports through China here. East Asian countries may also indirectly export through other countries, increasing the indirect exports bias even more. More than 25% of China's processing exports were destined for the U.S. and E.U. each. As a result, accounting for indirect exports significantly increases the East Asian countries' export-to-GDP ratios. Taiwan's export exposure to the U.S. increases by more than 7% when indirect exports through China's processing trade regime are taken into account (see Figure 6 ). For most other East Asian countries the export exposure increases with 1-5%. The results for East Asian countries' export exposure to the E.U. are similar.
Figure 6. Direct and Indirect Exports to the U.S. and E.U. as a share of GDP, 2007
Source: Authors' calculation using China Customs Statistics and CEPII/BACI data. The data are adjusted to correct for Hong Kong re-exports.
Import content bias.
The bilateral export-to-GDP ratio may also overestimate a country's exposure to external demand shocks since it ignores countries' reliance on imported inputs to produce its exports. This leads to an import content bias. A country's exports value not only captures the value produced in the country (domestic value added) but also the value of the imported components embodied in the exports. When estimating a country's economic exposure to external demand shocks, one should only consider domestic value added. Any negative impact on the imported components is transmitted to the countries located upstream in GVCs. Johnson and Noguera (2012) provide an estimate for the size of import content bias. By combining input-output tables and bilateral trade data, they find that world-wide the domestic value added share of exports is only 73%. In other words, 27% of world exports are the value of imported inputs embodied in these exports. Across East Asia, the domestic value added share varies widely, ranging from a low 37% for Singapore to a high 85% for Japan (see figure 7) .
To correct for the indirect export and import content biases, Johnson and Noguera (2012) estimate the value added content of bilateral trade. That is, they estimate the value added produced in a country i that is ultimately consumed in country j. As is shown in figure 10 , they find that a country's value added exports to the U.S. can differ significantly from its gross exports to the U.S, depending on their location in the GVC. 7 Japan's value added exports to the U.S. exceed gross exports because (i) it relies little on imported inputs for its exports and (ii) it has large indirect exports to the U.S. by supplying intermediates to other 7 Johnson and Noguera (2012) do not provide estimates for value added exports to the E.U. Direct exposure to US Indirect exposure to US Direct exposure to EU Indirect exposure to EU East Asian countries. In contrast, for all other East Asian countries the value added exports to the U.S. is less than gross exports. China's value added exports to the U.S., for example, is only 60% of its gross exports because (i) it heavily relies on imported components for its exports and (ii) as a final assembly platform has relatively little indirect exports to the U.S. 
GVCs and the great trade collapse
We can apply our framework to gain new insights into East Asia's trade collapse during the Global Recession of [2008] [2009] . East Asia's trade collapse during the crisis was largely driven by a large negative demand shock for durable goods in the West that was rapidly transmitted and amplified through GVCs. System-wide increases in trade frictions associated with evaporating credit further intensified the collapse, but did not lead to a systematic propagation of credit shocks throughout GVCs. The disproportionate rise of GVCs in durable goods sectors helps explain the increased vulnerability of trade to business cycle shocks. Since components are cross-hauled and double-counted multiple times in GVCs, the rise of GVCs has raised the weight of durable goods in trade compared to its weight in GDP. Bems et al. (2010) estimate that durable goods prior to the crisis had grown to almost 40% of trade, but amounted to only 10% of final demand. Given that consumers during a recession first and foremost hold off their purchases of durable goods, the transmission of demand shocks along GVCs of durable goods can induce trade to drop disproportionately compared to GDP.
Recent studies have provided ample evidence that such an asymmetric demand shock (also called a composition effect) was the main culprit of the trade collapse during the Global Recession. Bems et al. (2010) estimate that between 2008 and 2009 the demand for durable goods fell by 32% in the U.S. and 23% in the E.U.-15, whereas demand for nondurables and services fell by less than 4%. Using the global inputoutput table from Johnson and Noguera (2012) , they find that the changing composition of final demand accounted for 70% of the decline in trade relative to GDP. Using a more elaborate structural model, Eaton et al. (2011) similarly find that asymmetric demand changes account for 80% of the global decline in the trade-to-GDP ratio during the crisis.
In line with the bullwhip effect, there is also evidence that demand shocks have been amplified upstream during the Global Recession. Using Chinese processing trade data, Ma and Van Assche (2011) find that processing imports across industries contracted more severely than processing exports in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a year earlier. As is shown in figure 9 , with the exception of "motor vehicles", all durable goods sectors lie to the right of the 45 degree line, suggesting that processing imports dropped by a larger percent than processing exports. Similarly, Altomonte et al. (2012) used French firm-level data to show that trade in intermediates during the crisis overreacted to the final demand shock. Both results suggest that inventory adjustment along value chain may have contributed to the great trade collapse. This is confirmed by Alessandria et al. (2011) , who find that two-thirds of the decline in U.S. automobile imports during the crisis can be attributed to firms running down their inventories rather than a fall in final sales of autos.
The system-wide rise of trade frictions associated with evaporating credit, increasing non-tariff barriers and home bias in government stimulus plans further intensified the trade collapse (Jacks et al. 2009 , Eaton et al. 2011 . For instance, the credit crunch at the height of the crisis resulted in a severe reduction in the availability of external finance. This hit international trade particularly hard since exporters are heavier users of trade finance than domestic firms (Ahn et al. 2011) . 8 Chor and Manova (2011) indeed find that during the crisis, countries with higher interbank rates and therefore tighter credit availability cut back their exports to the U.S. more. Using Belgian and French firm-level data, respectively, Behrens et al. (2013) and Bricongne et al. (2012) also find that credit constraints during the crisis significantly worsened the export positions of financially constrained firms. As we have discussed above, the system-wide rise of such trade frictions should disproportionately affect trade within GVCs. To our knowledge, however, no study has empirically verified this. There is no evidence, however, that the financial crisis propagated credit chain effects through GVCs. Had there been strong credit chain effects, one should observe that trade during the crisis fell significantly along the extensive margin, as firms systematically terminated trade relations due to liquidity problems. Behrens et al. (2013) and Bricongne et al. (2012) find no evidence of this for Belgian and French firms, with most of the trade adjustment occurring at the intensive margin. To our knowledge, no study has conducted such analysis for East Asian firms.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed to what extent East Asia's integration into GVCs has made the region more vulnerable to Western business cycle shocks. We have discussed the mechanisms through which different types of supply chain shocks can propagate along value chains. Furthermore, we have tends to take longer than domestic transactions because of the longer time lags associated with international trade. Third, exporting is a more risky activity than domestic activities alone. East Asia's export dependence on Western markets will likely start to decline in the post-crisis era. With incomes throughout the region rising faster than in the West, China's domestic market expanding rapidly, and the three free trade agreements of China, Japan and South Korea with the ASEAN entering into force, a rising share of the demand for East Asian output should shift intra-regionally in the decades to come.
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This rebalancing process, however, will likely be gradual and lengthy. As a result, the processes described in this paper through which demand shocks in the West will reverberate throughout the East Asian region through GVCs can be expected to continue for years to come.
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Appendix B
To determine a country's position in the GVC, we first calculate for each country a set of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices:
• Source: Authors' calculations, using CEPII BACI data.
